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Abstract 
We use German linked employer-employee data for the years 1990, 1995 
and 2001 to analyze, which dimensions of wage setting differ across three 
wage-setting regimes: Establishments applying sectoral collective 
contracts, establishments with firm-level contracts and uncovered 
establishments. The empirical analysis is restricted to workers without 
supervisory functions in larger manufacturing firms and shows that for this 
group of workers base wages are higher in firms applying collective 
contracts, while returns to human capital and the gender wage gap are 
reduced. Moreover, during the nineties these effects have become 
stronger. 
 
Keywords: Collective contracts, wage flexibility, firm wage differentials, 
multi-level model 
JEL-classification: J31, J51 
 
 
*  We are grateful to Hermann Gartner and Torben Schewe for helpful hints and 
to Bernd Höptner, Uwe Rode and Dietrich Schwinger from the Lower Saxonian 
Statistical Office for their help in working with the Lower Saxonian Wages and 
Salary Structure Survey. Access to the data set used in this paper is based on 
a non-exclusive agreement of confidentiality with the Lower Saxonian 
Statistical Office. IAB IAB IAB IABDiscussionPaper No. 6/2004   4 
 
 
1  Introduction 
A number of comparative macroeconomic studies (OECD Employment 
Outlook, 1997, Flanagan, 1997) analyses the impact of union density and 
bargaining coverage on the distribution of wages. These studies face, ho-
wever, the problem that the wage distribution is affected by additional 
causal factors that differ between countries and that are difficult to control 
for. Microeconomic studies concentrate mainly on the wage effects of indi-
vidual union membership (Card, 1996, Blau and Kahn, 1999, Booth and 
Bryan, 2001, Budd and Na, 2000, Card et al., 2003). They discuss the ef-
fects on unions on the wage structure, i.e. the wage differentials between 
men and women, between skilled and unskilled workers as well as be-
tween blue-collar and white-collar workers.  
In continental Europe, specifically in Germany, however, with its systems 
of corporatist wage-setting, the application of collective wage contracts 
within firms is arguably more important for wage-setting and pay differen-
tials than union membership. In West Germany less than one third of em-
ployees are union members, but almost 80 percent of workers are covered 
by either industry-wide collective agreements or firm-level contracts 
(Pfeiffer, 2003, for the year 2000), which impose minimum wage stan-
dards at the firm level. The striking difference results mainly from the fact 
that firms covered by collective contracts usually do not differentiate 
across workers with and without union membership, although they are not 
obliged to pay union wages to non-union members. 
The main topic of our paper is to study empirically which dimensions of 
wage setting – base wages or returns to individual characteristics – differ 
across wage setting regimes in Germany during the nineties and might 
thus restrict the options of pay policies of firms covered by collective con-
tracts. We distinguish three wage-setting regimes: First establishments 
applying collective contracts at the industry-level, second establishments 
with firm-level contracts and third establishments without coverage. Since 
union wage effects will affect wage-setting at the firm level we model the 
wage effects of collective contracts as multi-dimensional firm wage differ-
entials, using linked employer-employee data (Hamermesh 1999) and ap-
plying a multi-level model of wage determination. The results show that 
an application of collective contracts correlates with higher firm-specific IAB IAB IAB IABDiscussionPaper No. 6/2004   5 
 
 
base wages, reduced firm-specific rates of return to human capital and 
gender wage gaps compared to individual wage bargaining. In addition, 
collective contracts tend to increase base wages and compress rates of 
return to human capital in economic recessions. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the theoreti-
cal background, including the basic features of the German system of in-
dustrial relations, and formulates testable hypotheses. After a short review 
of the literature in Section 3, Section 4 lays out the framework of the   
econometric model. Section 5 describes data and variables. The empirical 
results are discussed in Section 6 and Section 7 summarizes the results 
and draws some conclusions. 
2  Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
For a given firm we define the base wage as the wage a standard worker 
can expect to obtain within this firm. As firm wage differentials we define 
the difference between the base wage and rates of return to observed 
characteristics paid by this firm and the standard firm in the economy. 
Kramarz et al. (1996) denote these as global firm wage differentials since 
we cannot control for unobserved characteristics of the workforce.  
There are three main sources of firm wage differentials (Groshen, 1991):  
•  Bargaining power of owners or managers and the workforce of a com-
pany varies across firms, as well as firms’ product market power and 
thus their ability to pay. Thus different firms will pay rent-sharing com-
ponents of different size to all or some employees.  
•  Dependent on the production technology chosen incentive problems 
might prevail and induce some firms to pay efficiency or seniority 
wages.  
•  Skill sensitive technologies and positive external effects of qualification 
are a source of sorting processes of employees across firms, with some 
firms employing mainly high-skilled, high-wage employees and others 
employing mainly low-paid, low-skilled workers.  
If bargaining power, incentive problems or sorting processes are relevant 
for the entire workforce of a firm, wage differentials across firms will 
manifest themselves in the base wage. If the sources of firm wage differ-IAB IAB IAB IABDiscussionPaper No. 6/2004   6 
 
 
entials are, however, more prevalent for skilled workers or for workers of 
one gender, we expect an impact on firm-specific rates of return for skills 
or on gender wage differentials. 
Union wage policies can briefly be characterized as follows: First, unions 
aim to improve the living standard of their members, mainly by bargaining 
for higher wages or lower working hours (Freeman 1982). Models of bar-
gaining outcomes obtain the result that the union wage mark-up over   
alternative income increases with union power and decreases with product 
market competition, labour intensity and workers’ fear of job loss, while 
the alternative wage increases with lower unemployment and higher un-
employment benefits (Layard et al. 1991). Second, unions try to standard-
ize and compress wages across as well as within firms, in particular by 
attaching wages to job-grades (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). Wage com-
pression strengthens the organizational unity among workers with differ-
ent skills and tasks up to a certain degree. Additionally, union members 
might have preferences for wage compression if the mean exceeds the 
median wage or if they are risk-averse and uncertain about the future de-
velopment of their wages (Agell 1999, 2002). The standardization of 
wages restricts opportunities for gender wage discrimination and since 
women are more frequently in the lower ranges of the wage distribution, 
they might benefit from the compression of wages. 
These union wage policies have an impact on firm wage differentials if 
bargaining power, incentive problems or sorting processes differ across 
wage-setting regimes. Bargaining power will be enhanced by unionization 
and raises wages in companies with collective contracts while the actual 
size of rents to be shared depends also on firms’ ability to pay. However, 
it is also possible that in particular those firms facing incentive problems 
apply collective contracts – for instance, Lazear (1981) argues that unions 
may act as a substitute for supervisors. Furthermore it might be that 
workers who are on average more productive and homogeneous self-
select into firms applying collective contracts or that firms applying these 
contracts are on average more productive.  
Under the German system of sectoral and regional bargaining employers’ 
associations and unions conclude collective wage agreements that set a 
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and which in rare cases are extended to non-member firms by the Federal 
Ministry of Labour. In addition, non-members of employers’ associations 
might agree formally or informally to meet the conditions of these 
industry-level agreements or refer to these agreements in individual con-
tracts. As an alternative to the application of industry-wide collective 
agreements companies can negotiate directly with a union for a firm-level 
contract. Note that works councils do not have the right to bargain over 
wages, although de facto they have some impact on pay and the structure 
of remuneration (Hübler/Jirjahn 2003).  
Since wages of uncovered firms might react faster and more strongly to 
macroeconomic conditions the pay differential between uncovered and 
covered firms might shrink in an economic upswing and widen in a reces-
sion. This does not require that potential wage reactions of covered firms 
are excluded. Reactions might consist of augmenting the gap between ef-
fective and contractual wages for some or all employees in an upswing 
and reducing the gap in a recession. They are, however, restricted by the 
prevailing minimum wage structure set by collective contracts and depend 
on the existence of wage gaps. Furthermore the wage adjustment might 
be more cautious and gradual since firms expect unions to compensate 
wage reductions by higher claims during the subsequent negotiations and 
to interpret pay hikes as a signal that contractual wages should be re-
aligned with effective wages. 
Summing up, these considerations lead to the following hypotheses: 
•  First, base wages will be higher in firms with collective contracts, partly 
as a result of the increased bargaining power of employees. 
•  Second, rates of return to human capital should be lower in firms apply-
ing collective contracts, since unions aim to compress wages across skill 
groups. 
•  Third, the gender specific wage differential can be expected to be lower 
in firms covered by collective contracts.  
•  Fourth and more tentatively, the impact of collective contracts on firm 
wage differentials is expected to vary cyclically, declining in upswings 
and widening in recessions.  IAB IAB IAB IABDiscussionPaper No. 6/2004   8 
 
 
3   Short Review of the Literature 
Freeman (1982) in a landmark paper shows that unionized companies 
have a much lower within and between dispersion of wages than compa-
rable non-covered firms in the same industries. These findings are con-
firmed in a recent and detailed survey and a research update till 2001 for 
the USA, UK and Canada (Card, Lemieux and Riddell 2003). The authors 
show that unions tend to reduce wage inequality among men with differ-
ent ages and educational levels, and that wage inequality among women 
is not affected by unions.  
Hartog et al. (2000) assess the magnitudes of wage differentials under 
corporatist labour relations within the Netherlands. They conclude that in 
terms of the wage structure it is mainly the regime with firm level bargain-
ing that differs from the collective bargaining and the individual bargaining 
regime. The relationship between coverage of firms by collective contracts 
and wage inequality in Germany has been analyzed on the basis of linked 
employer – employee data sets for the year 1995 by Stephan and Gerlach 
(2003). The authors find that the application of collective contracts is cor-
related with a higher base wage for all employees of a firm and that the 
male-female wage gap declines compared to the wage-setting regime with 
individual agreements. 
4   Econometric Model 
The applied method (see for instance Raudenbush and Bryk 2002) takes 
account of the fact that firm-wage differentials can a) occur at several   
dimensions of wage-setting and that b) wage-setting in different firms is 
not isolated from each other. The first fact is not taken into account by 
studies modelling firm-specific effects on wages as one-dimensional fixed 
effects (see Stephan 2002 for an overview). The latter fact is disregarded 
in studies estimating multi-dimensional firm wage differentials using sepa-
rate Ordinary Least Squares estimates for each firm (Kramarz et al., 
1996, Leonard and Van Audenrode, 1996). Our study is to some degree 
similar to Cardoso’s investigations for Portugal (Cardoso, 1999, 2000), 
who does, however, not control for the wage-setting regime a firm is ap-
plying. IAB IAB IAB IABDiscussionPaper No. 6/2004   9 
 
 
At the first level of the model log wages yij of individual i = 1…N in firm j = 
1…M are determined by a K×1-vector of explanatory variables Xij, which 
includes a constant and K-1 observed worker characteristics.  
(1) y ij = Xij’βj + rij. 
The individual level residual is given by rij ~ N(0,σ
2). The K×1-vector of pa-
rameters βj varies across firms, and can be interpreted as a vector of firm 
wage differentials. However, we do not assume purely random variations 
of βj across firms, but take into account that at the second level of the mo-
del βj is determined by a 1×L-vector wj
 of explaining variables, which inclu-
des a constant and L-1 observed firm characteristics. With Wj = IK⊗wj as a 
K×K⋅L-matrix it follows that 
(2)  βj = Wjγ + uj. 
The K⋅L×1-parameter vector γ includes the systematic influences on wages 
in the economy. The K×1-vector of firm level residuals uj ~ N(0,T) contains 
for each firm the deviation of firm-specific wage parameters from their 
expected value, given wj respectively Wj, with 



















Concerning the co-variances the following assumptions are made (Rau-
denbush and Bryk 2002, 255): Cov(rij,ukj) = 0, Cov(Xkij,rij) = 0, Cov(wj,ukj) = 0, 
Cov(wj,rij) = 0 and Cov(Xkij,uk‘j) = 0 for all k, k´ and and with k = 1...K and  = 
1...L, where Xkij, wj and ukj are single elements of Xij, wj and uj. 
 
Estimation proceeds as follows. First the true parameters βj in (2) are ap-
proximated by firm-specific Ordinary-Least-Square estimates  j ˆ β , 
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(3)  j ˆ β  = Wjγ + uj + ej 
which involves an additional error term e j ~ N(0,Vj).  Equation (3) can be 
estimated by Generalized Least Squares. 
(4)  γ ˆ  = (Σ Wj’ ∆j
-1 Wj)
-1 Σ Wj’ ∆j
-1  j ˆ β  with  ∆j = Var( j ˆ β ) = Var(uj + ej) = T + Vj. 
The parameter dispersion matrix T and the error dispersion matrix Vj have, 
however, to be estimated. Maximum likelihood estimates can be obtained 
by an iterative procedure, also adjusting the estimates of the fixed para-
meters γ during each step. Since Iterative Generalized Least Squares in 
general produces biased estimates (which can be important in small sam-
ples) unbiased restricted maximum likelihood estimates are conducted. All 
estimates has been carried out using the program package HLM 5.05 by 
Raudenbush, Bryk and Congdon. 
 
Note that the method applied does not control for self-selection of workers 
into firms and of firms into wage-setting regimes. Thus, the results pre-
sented have to be interpreted as correlations rather than as causal rela-
tionships. 
5  Data and Variables 
The empirical analysis is based on the three recent waves of the Salary 
and Wage Structure Survey ("Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung") for 
the federal German State of Lower Saxony, which were conducted in the 
years 1990, 1995 and 2001. Lower Saxony is one of the larger federal 
states in northwest Germany and covers around 11 percent of all West 
German employees. The data are drawn as a two-stage random sample 
from all establishments in the entire manufacturing sector and in selected 
service sectors. Establishments as well as employees included in the data 
set differ in successive surveys. The data do thus not allow controlling for 
unobserved worker heterogeneity, which might be even more important in 
wage-setting than firm effects on wages (Abowd et al., 1999). 
As we have already emphasized it is not individual union membership, but 
rather the application of collective wage contracts at the firm level which IAB IAB IAB IABDiscussionPaper No. 6/2004   11 
 
 
has an impact on wages in Germany. The Salary and Wage Structure Sur-
vey asks, if a firm applies a specific collective contract at the industry or 
firm level in remunerating workers, but does not distinguish between legal 
obligations to meet the terms of the agreement or of adopting them vol-
untarily.  
The analysis is restricted to full-time employees aged 16 to 65 with a 
working time of at least 30 weekly hours and an hourly wage of at least 5 
Euro. Furthermore, workers with supervisory functions and workers not 
receiving collectively negotiated wages within firms applying collective 
contracts have been excluded from the subsequent analysis (these are 
typically workers with very high or very low wages). At the firm level the 
analysis is restricted to manufacturing companies with 100 to 10.000 em-
ployees, for which at least 20 observations are available. Note that the 
number of observations is smaller in 2001 compared to 1990 and 1995; 
the underlying reason is that the survey covered a number of additional 
service sectors in 2001, but less firms and workers in manufacturing. 
The dependent variable analysis is log hourly gross wages. For purposes of 
comparison wages are converted for 1990 and 1995 from Deutsche Mark 
to Euros. At the individual level the following variables are included in Xij: 
A constant, years required for the highest educational attainment (abbre-
viated as schooling), tenure and potential experience (to keep the model 
as simple as possible, both enter only in linear form), a dummy for gen-
der, and a dummy for a blue- or white-collar worker. Schooling and poten-
tial experience are interpreted as proxies for general human capital, while 
tenure – although problems of endogeneity might occur – captures specific 
human capital. At the firm level in wj respectively Wj the following vari-
ables are incorporated: A constant, two dummies for the application of a 
sectoral or firm level collective contract, mean years of schooling, the 
share of female employees and firm size. Mean years of schooling are 
supposed to mirror the mean human capital endowment within a firm. It is 
well established that wages decrease with the share of female employees 
(Bayard et al. 2003) and increase with firm size (Gerlach and Hübler 
1998).  
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To facilitate the interpretation the variables in Xij and Wj are centered on 
their grand mean in the multivariate analysis (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002, 
32 ff.), with the exception of the dummy variables for the wage-setting 
regime. As a consequence the firm-specific first level constants β0j from 
equation (1) indicate the base wage a standard worker – approximately 
12 years of schooling, 11 years of tenure, 22 years of potential experi-
ence, 25 percent female and 25 percent white-collar worker – can expect 
to obtain in a firm with specific characteristics. The second level constants 
γk0 from equation (2) show the wage effects of individual characteristics 
within otherwise standard firms – mean years of schooling, mean share of 
female workers and mean firm size – that do not apply a collective con-
tract.  
6  Empirical Results 
Descriptive results for the sample investigated are summarized in Table 1. 
It is obvious that wages are on average lower and more dispersed for 
workers if firms negotiate wages individually. From 1990 to 1995 respec-
tively to 2001 nominal wages rose by about 20 respectively 40 percent. In 
comparison, the harmonized consumer price index has been growing less 
(about 20 or 30 percent during these periods). The difference in mean log 
wages across firms applying collective contracts and those negotiating 
wages individually barely changed from 1990 to 2001. Figure 1 displays 
additional Kernel estimates of the distribution of log hourly wages per 
wage-setting regime and year.  
Among the explanatory variables noticeable differences across wage-
setting regimes can be detected: in companies not applying collective con-
tracts average tenure is about 4 years shorter, the percentage of female 
workers is higher, and average firm size is smaller (Table 1).  
Table 2 presents the estimates of the systematic parameters γ  of the 
multi-level model, obtained from equation (4). Displayed probability val-
ues refer to robust, Huber-corrected standard errors (Raudenbush and 
Bryk 2002: 276 ff.). It has to be pointed out again that the first level con-
stant is a function of firm characteristics and describes the base wage for 
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level constant describes wage components paid in an otherwise standard 
firm that does not apply a collective contract. 
First, the economic results of an application of collective contracts will be 
discussed, starting with their impact on base wages. In 1990 a standard 
worker employed in a standard firm not applying a collective contract re-
ceived a log hourly wage of 2.298. If he would had worked in a standard 
firm applying an industry or firm level collective contract, his wage would 
have increased by 4, respectively 3 percent. The wage gain of working 
under industry level collective contracts increases to 9 percent in 1995 
and 12 percent in 2001; and to 7 percent in 1995 and 11 percent in 2001 
for working under firm level collective contracts. These pay differentials 
are lower than the gross difference in log wages shown in Table 1. Thus a 
proportion of the higher wages paid in firms applying collective contracts 
must be due to different worker characteristics. However, as formulated in 
our first hypothesis, collective contracts tend to raise base wages.   
Furthermore, the impact of collective contracts on base wages has been 
rising significantly in the nineties. 
We now turn to the other dimensions of firm wage policies. Compared to 
firms negotiating wages individually, returns to schooling are significantly 
lower under industry level collective contracts in 1995 and 2001, while re-
turns to tenure are significantly lower under these as well as under firm 
level collective contracts in the three years investigated. This is line with 
our second hypothesis, which predicted compressed returns for human 
capital as a result of union induced wage compression. An additional strik-
ing result is that returns to schooling and tenure were more compressed 
by collective contracts in 2001 than in 1990. Apparently the increase in 
the impact of collective contracts on base wages has been offset in a great 
degree by a decline in returns to human capital. 
The gender wage gap in 1990 in firms not applying collective contracts 
amounted to 21 percent; it shrank to 17 percent in 2001. A noteworthy 
result is that in all three years investigated the gender wage gap is about 
5 percentage points smaller in firms applying collective contracts. This 
supports our third hypothesis.  IAB IAB IAB IABDiscussionPaper No. 6/2004   14 
 
 
Second, the results of the additional explanatory variables will be charac-
terized briefly. A strong impact on firm wage differentials is found for 
mean years of schooling within a firm: Firm-specific base wages and in 
most cases rates of return to tenure and experience increase significantly 
with average years of schooling. This might on the one hand indicate posi-
tive external effects of qualification. On the other hand the underlying   
reason might be sorting: High-wage firms attract on average better quali-
fied workers. The share of female workers within a firm is negatively re-
lated to firm-specific base wages – a larger proportion of women in a firm 
are correlated with lower wages paid to a standard worker. The well 
known firm size effect on wages manifests itself mainly in a slightly higher 
firm-specific base wage. 
Third, empirical studies of multi-dimensional firm wage differentials show 
that firm-specific coefficients vary strongly across firms (Kramarz et al., 
1996, Leonard and Van Audenrode, 1996, Cardoso, 2000). This is valid 
also for Germany: Table 2 shows that all estimated standard deviations of 
the macro residuals uj from equation (2) are significantly different from 
zero. Furthermore, with the exception of returns to schooling, the esti-
mated standard deviation of macro residuals has been increasing over 
time, which implies that wage-setting has become more heterogeneous 
across firms. In addition, the dispersion of individual level wage residuals 
rij has been rising over time. 
Summing up, we find support for the first three hypotheses, namely that 
base wages are higher in firms applying collective contracts, while rates of 
return to human capital and the gender wage gap are lower compared to 
companies with individual wage contracts. The fourth hypothesis that   
differences across wage-setting regimes might change during the business 
cycle is also confirmed. The overall percentage difference between 
log mean wages across regimes hardly changed in the three years under 
consideration (Table 1). But in 1990 the West-German economy was ex-
posed to an economic boom due to the strong demand in the process of 
reunification, while the years 1995 and 2001 are characterized by low 
growth rates and declining or stagnant employment, furthermore a steep 
decline of demand began in 2001. In accordance with the fourth hypothe-
sis we find that compared to individual wage agreements collective con-IAB IAB IAB IABDiscussionPaper No. 6/2004   15 
 
 
tracts increased base wages and compressed rates of return to human 
capital substantially in 1995 and 2001 with respect to 1990 (Table 2).  
7  Conclusions 
The results of our paper show that it is warranted to model the wage ef-
fects of collective contracts in Germany as firm wage differentials, taking 
into account differences in base wage rates as well as in rates of return to 
observed worker characteristics. In interpreting our results, it should be 
taken into account that the analysis presented is restricted to workers 
without supervisory functions, who are working in large firms (100 to 
10.000 employees) in the manufacturing sector within one of the larger 
federal states of West Germany. 
First, our results confirm that all investigated components of wage setting 
differ significantly across firms. Second, the main result of our analysis is 
that an application of collective contracts in Germany is correlated with 
higher firm-specific base wages, reduced firm-specific rates of return to 
human capital and gender wage gaps compared to individual wage bar-
gaining. The results indicate that idiosyncratic firm-specific wage policies 
are important, while at the same time and in particular higher base wages 
and reduced returns to human capital might restrict the options for and 
the flexibility in wage-setting of firms applying collective contracts. Third, 
during the nineties we observe augmenting differences across wage-
setting regimes in the sense that collective contracts increasingly tend to 
raise base wages and compress returns to human capital.  
Admittedly, our results are in some sense descriptive. The important issue 
cannot be addressed conclusively if the observed relationship between pay 
components and collective contracts depends on union bargaining power 
and changes in union pay policy or on self-selection and sorting processes 
of workers into wage-setting regimes. If bargaining power of unions is an 
important determinant of the observed firm wage differentials – and the 
findings are supportive of this assumption –, the economic consequences 
of higher wages and reduced wage dispersion in firms applying collective 
contracts are ambivalent. On the one hand unions in conjunction with 
works councils might act as a voice mechanism improving productivity 
(Freeman/Medoff 1984) and as an insurance against future wage uncer-IAB IAB IAB IABDiscussionPaper No. 6/2004   16 
 
 
tainty (Agell 1999, 2002). On the other hand the German system of indus-
trial relations might enhance the segregation of the workforce into insiders 
and outsiders. Workers in firms applying industry level collective contracts 
gain from higher base wages and have an on average longer tenure, while 
at the same time less fortunate workers earn lower wages and face higher 
risks of unemployment (Bertola et al. 2002). In addition, the incentives for 
an acquisition of human capital are reduced in core sectors which might be 
ominous for an economy increasingly based on information and communi-
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
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Table 2:  Estimates for the systematic parameters γ γ γ γ by year 
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